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The paper problematizes the national soft power strategies of authoritarian states 
arguing that many of their features stem from those countries’ political regime. In 
particular, the author focuses on such features as actors involved in soft power 
policies, the public media’s international and domestic rhetoric, the presence or 
absence of ideological commitments, strategies’ proactiveness/reactiveness as 
well as their long- and short-termness. The author presents his argumentation in 
a fashion similar to what is called theory-building process tracing: first, he shows 
causal links between an autocratic political regime and each of those features, and 
then illustrates them with relevant examples taken from case studies and media 
publications on the soft power strategies of contemporary Russia and China.
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Since Joseph Nye coined the concept of soft power in 1990, political scientists have generated two different assumptions regarding its applicability to 
national foreign policies. The proponents of the first one argue that soft power 
- the ability of a country’s good image to ‘endear’ it to other nations and cause 
them to follow its ideas and policies - is primarily peculiar to democratic states, 
since, according to them, soft power is based on democracy, freedom, pluralism, 
tolerance, which they deem as universal principles (Gallarotti 2011, 30). 
Consequently, countries that oppose such principles have very little potential to 
be internationally attractive and, hence, their soft power is somewhat doomed 
to fail (Nye 2004, 73-75; Nye 2013). Such a view, albeit sometimes expressed 
nowadays as well, was still more widespread in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
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since it is in tune with the general spirit of that time. The democratic euphoria, 
that dominated intellectual debates following the long-awaited end of the Cold 
War, generated a widespread belief (and hope) that geopolitics in the classical 
sense of the term was gone, and in the future realpolitik would be replaced by 
idealpolitik - the idea that was reflected in the then dominant IR theories, such 
as the democratic peace theory.
However, later, as that euphoria gradually vanished, most scholars started 
taking more sober looks at the use of soft power in foreign policies. On the 
one hand, it was due to the fact that the changing realities of international 
politics put in doubt the idea of democracies’ peacefulness. Indeed, the 1990-
2000s witnessed an increasing adoption of coercive measures by the world’s 
leading democratic states: economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure - let alone 
military operations - became commonplace. Yet, most importantly, that change 
in academic interest was triggered by the fact that autocracies eventually 
came to understand the power of a good image in world politics and started to 
increasingly develop their soft power strategies. The main reason behind it most 
probably lies in the “diffusion of power” in international politics in general, 
which, according to Nye (1990, 160), is caused by “economic interdependence, 
transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, 
and changing political issues.” Such a power diffusion makes it practically 
impossible for any state, no matter authoritarian or democratic, to maintain 
its international influence any longer without active soft power policies. As a 
result, most contemporary researchers have to admit that soft power has been, 
as Christopher Walker (2016) puts it, “hijacked” by autocracies with leading IR 
academic journals being full of case studies on autocracies’ soft power strategies. 
It is now getting increasingly popular to study regional powers like Turkey 
(Oguzlu 2007), Iran (Wastnidge 2015) and even Saudi Arabia (Gallarotti and 
Al-Filali 2014), let alone the fact that papers on global authoritarian powers - 
Russia and China - have become commonplace. Perhaps the most prominent 
attempt “to ‘de-Westernise’ the concept of soft power” (Barr et al. 2015, 13) was 
made in May 2014 at a conference at the University of Newcastle. Based on the 
papers presented there, Politics’ special issue ‘The Soft Power of Hard States’ is 
made of country-focused case studies on Russia, China and Iran.
However, though such case studies abound, it appears that little attempt has 
been undertaken to appropriately theorize and generalize on the impact of a 
country’s political regime (in particular, authoritarian) on its soft power strategy. 
What is more, some case studies seem to completely disregard such an impact: 
instead, they explain the peculiarities of autocracies’ soft power strategies by 
reference to other factors, such as national character, culture, history, religion, 
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material capabilities etc (Altinay 2008; Parshin 2013). While such explanations 
are certainly reasonable, they still appear somewhat incomplete, especially 
given that the idea, that a political regime affects a foreign policy strategy in 
general, finds rather strong support in the academic literature. For instance, it is 
contended that, as distinct from autocracies, democracies are unlikely to make 
war on one another (Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994), democracies’ foreign 
policy is more likely to take account of public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; 
Katz 2000), democracies are more likely to win at wars (Reiter and Stam 2002), 
their foreign policies are strongly affected by the election cycle (Smith 2004) etc.
In this essay, I attempt to go from country-focused case studies to a more 
general level of analysis arguing that certain features of autocracies’ soft power 
strategies stem from their political regime. The actual list of such features in 
my paper is suggestive rather than exhaustive and rests upon the preliminary 
review of country-focused case studies and the selection of only those features 
that, first, are repeatedly found across multiple studies and, second, appear to 
be logically dependent on a country’s political regime rather than other factors. 
In particular, I focus on such features as actors involved in a soft power strategy, 
the state-owned media’s international and domestic rhetoric, the presence or 
absence of ideological commitments, strategies’ proactiveness/reactiveness as 
well as their long- and short-termness. With regard to each of these variables, 
I present my argumentation in a fashion similar to what methodologists call 
“theory-building process tracing” (see Beach and Pedersen 2013): first, I show 
a causal link between an autocratic political regime and each of these variables, 
and then exemplify my arguments empirically with references to country-
focused case studies and, to a lesser extent, media publications on Russia and 
China. My choice of these two countries is determined by the fact that, first, 
their soft power strategies seem to have been studied in a more detailed way 
than those of other autocracies and, second, these countries’ soft power policies 
appear to be most comprehensive to date (they both possess state-owned media 
that broadcast internationally as well as state-funded agencies that specifically 
focus on promoting their image abroad etc.), which is especially relevant for 
my study. The last chapter, Conclusions, summarizes my key arguments and 
discusses possible topics for further research.
DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding, it seems necessary to clarify all the concepts used throughout 
the paper. Following Joseph Nye, I refer to soft power as a form of social power 
that consists in “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payment” (Nye 2004). Soft power works through “a positive image in 
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world affairs that endears nations to other nations in the world polity” (Gallarotti 
2011, 27-28). More precisely (Ibid., 28),
[t]his positive image generates respect and admiration, which in turn render 
nations that have soft power more endearing in the eyes of other nations. The 
endearment can be so strong that other nations may even attempt to emulate 
the policies and/or actions of soft power nations, domestic and/or foreign.
Accordingly, soft power strategy can be defined as a coherent and purposeful 
set of actions aimed to improve an IR actor’s (usually, a country’s) image abroad 
(Patalakh 2016, 89).1
Whereas soft power strategies encompass a wide range of behaviours aiming 
to make a country attractive both among foreign governments and publics, one 
of their key components is public diplomacy, which is defined as “the process 
by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the 
interests and extend the values of those being represented” (Sharp 2005, 106). 
In this article, the next two sections primarily deal with public diplomacy in 
particular, while the three subsequent ones - with soft power strategies in 
broader terms, including public diplomacy.
SOFT POWER STRATEGIES’ CHARACTERISTICS DEPENDENT 
ON A POLITICAL REGIME
ROLE OF THE STATE, THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY
By definition,2 authoritarian rule presupposes that the state places various 
barriers that hinder the independence of civil society institutions, which 
autocracies view, first, as obstacles to consolidating their power and institutions 
and, second, as supporters of democracy promotion from abroad (Rutzen 2015, 
1 Such a definition may appear too vague and general, but it allows taking account of the 
fact that soft power strategies may engage various scopes of power, i.e. the aspects of the targets’ 
behaviour that the strategizer attempts to influence (Baldwin 2016, 51). Depending on a case, soft 
power strategies may involve both political (getting others to accept one’s foreign and domestic 
policies) and non-political goals (e.g. attracting foreign tourists and entrepreneurs). Since, as a 
political scientist, I am primarily interested in the political goals of soft power strategies, this study 
proceeds from Gallarotti’s above-given understanding of soft power, which respectively affects the 
relevance of its findings.
2 Authoritarianism is commonly defined as “a form of government that monopolizes authority 
over the state without guaranteeing political pluralism or defense of civil liberties and with little or 
no accountability to the population” (Vaillant 2012).
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28-29). With regard to independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
authoritarian governments normally use of one the following pretexts to enact 
such barriers: “1) protecting state sovereignty; 2) promoting transparency and 
accountability in the civil society sector; 3) enhancing aid effectiveness and 
coordination; and 4) pursuing national security, counterterrorism, and anti–
money laundering objectives” (Ibid., 31). According to empirical studies, the 
barriers at hand can take up to ten different forms (for details, see Ibid., 30-
31), the variations of which happen to be particularly original in some states. 
For instance, a recent Russian law has obliged all the NGOs that receive foreign 
donations to register as “foreign agents” - a collocation that in Russian means 
“spies” - and all those that refused to re-register have been closed (Flikke 2016). 
China widely practices putting NGOs’ leaders under house arrest or encouraging 
them to leave the country, especially when it hosts important international 
events, like the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai EXPO etc (Tai 2015, 
23). In such circumstances, when the very existence of independent NGOs is 
endangered and they have to struggle for survival, civil society often finds itself 
disorganized, weak and discouraged from taking actions. Due to the scarcity 
of resources, independent NGOs tend to find it unaffordable to participate in 
expensive initiatives and hardly possible to attract smart and talented people to 
work for them. Naturally, in such conditions, civil society can barely be engaged 
in any activities that have a significant impact on a country’s international 
image: for instance, most of the activities of Chinese NGOs are local or, at best, 
nationwide, since “most Chinese NGOs lack the resources, experience, networks, 
and knowledge of foreign policy-making and contemporary international 
relations to engage effectively outside of China’s borders” (Brenner 2012, 136). 
In limited cases, however, the authoritarian state can support those 
independent NGOs whose activities do not contradict government views (Ye 
2003), but such happens rarely against the backdrop of mutual distrust between 
the authoritarian state and civil society. What the government is likelier to do 
is imitate civil society institutions by creating government-organized NGOs 
(GONGOs) which are financed by the state and hence, remain fully loyal to it 
(Foster 2001). As case studies show, Chinese GONGOs reportedly enjoy better 
funding and hence, have better potential for employing more professional staff 
than independent NGOs; however, a strict governmental control turns out to be 
eventually counter-productive: a very limited capacity to conduct independent 
projects engenders a situation in which “many GONGOs consequently become 
inactive and lack initiative” (Jin 2007, 82). This notwithstanding, both China 
and Russia are increasingly using GONGOs in their public diplomacies. The 
Chinese government does it first, to get access to Western developmental 
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aid which is granted only to NGOs and not to state agencies and second, 
“to access the growing private charitable donations of Chinese citizens and 
firms to humanitarian and development projects worldwide” (Brenner 2012, 
135-136). Likewise, an active use of GONGOs in public diplomacy helps the 
Kremlin imitate a civil society: to date, the Kremlin “has established several 
organisations, notably the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund and the Russian 
Council on International Affairs, which seek to engage civil society institutions 
in humanitarian and cultural ventures abroad” (Wilson 2015b, 1189).
A similar logic applies to the private sector as well: as a rule, modern 
autocracies encourage private entrepreneurship, but treat it suspiciously if it 
becomes too strong and hence, presents a potential challenge to the regime. 
Moreover, whereas businessmen normally have a free hand in the economic 
sphere, in the political and social life they are bound to go hand in hand with the 
government and its initiatives; otherwise, they risk being punished, at worst, as 
heavily as up to losing their business. Russian authorities, for instance, widely 
invite the private sector to sponsor state-supported big international events 
like the 2014 Sochi Olympics and the 2018 World Cup. However, Russian 
entrepreneurs get punished if they are involved in politics not on Putin’s side: 
to exemplify, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman of “Yukos” oil company, got 
imprisoned when he started to finance pro-Western liberal political parties 
(Amsterdam and Peroff 2007, 36-39); another businessman, Dmitry Zimin, had 
to close his “Dynasty” foundation reportedly for financing seminars and lectures 
on promoting liberalism in Russia (The Moscow Times 2015).
Such an inability of the private sector and civil society to have an independent 
role in social life in authoritarian states leaves the state to be to a great extent the 
primary actor that may have a substantial impact on a country’s international 
image. By contrast, in democracies, the private sector and civil society are free to 
be engaged in political and social life either by supporting some existent forces 
or acting as an independent actor. It would not even be an overstatement to say 
that democratic states’ soft power is to a great extent developed “from below,” 
reflecting the needs of a country’s private sector and civil society, for whom 
a country’s good image opens additional opportunities for new investments, 
customers, projects etc. Therefore, democracies’ soft power strategy is a 
complicated system of private-public partnership, while the soft power of an 
authoritarian state is, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, is a strategy of the state, 
carried out by the state and for the state.
Moreover, to speak about soft power in terms of coherent strategies is 
often possible merely as far as authoritarian countries are concerned, since 
only such states are in a position to elaborate, adopt and fully coordinate 
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the implementation of policies aiming to enhance their countries’ image. In 
democracies, the state is in a position either only to direct public diplomacy in 
very general terms (e.g. it issues recommendations and advises, brings together 
representatives of different sectors for discussions etc.), or supplement civil 
society’s activities in order to fill in the gaps where the private sector does not 
desire or is not able to work. As Nye argues (2008, 105), must of US international 
broadcasting is done by private TV channels and radio stations; however, “[i]f 
there is no market for broadcasting in Serbo-Croatian or Pashtu, companies will 
not broadcast in those languages,” which makes the US government invest in 
the media like the Voice of America. When civil society is advanced and the rule 
of law works for real, the state’s comprehensive control over public diplomacy 
appears to be not only impossible from a legal perspective, but also unnecessary 
in terms of efficiency, since private initiatives are believed to have, as a rule, 
better chances to be viewed as independent and hence, more credible.
For what concern concrete examples, perhaps one of the most indicative 
examples of the role of the state in democracies and authoritarian countries’ 
soft power is how China and Russia on the one hand and the UK on the other 
approached hosting the Olympic Games in terms of public diplomacy. One 
empirical study (Li 2013) revealed that the organisation of the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics was done in a highly centralized manner under a strong control of the 
government with public diplomacy being barely different from propaganda: it 
aimed to sell China internationally in a positive way, show its economic reforms 
and social system from a favourable perspective and avoid discussing socially 
sensitive issues like the Tibet. The same logic equally applies to the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics which the Russian political elite used “to validate Russia’s claims for 
the re-establishment of national greatness and underscore the continuity of its 
indispensability in world affairs” (Grix and Kramareva 2015, 4) with the official 
messages sent to the outer world focusing on ‘promoting a dynamic image of 
the Russian nation’ and countering the international media’s ‘campaign against 
Russia’s human rights record’ (Hutchings et al. 2015, 641). On the other hand, 
the British authorities had neither wish, nor capacity to direct the organisation 
of the 2012 London Olympics in a centralized way: rather, they coordinated and 
facilitated the activities of a broad range of actors engaged in the organisation of 
the Olympics with public diplomacy being centred not on the British culture and 
society, but more on global social issues (e.g. the protection of the environment, 
the welfare of children, women and disabled people) as well as the British 
involvement in their solution (Li 2013).
DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL RHETORIC
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The aforesaid suppression of human rights in authoritarian states concerns, 
inter alia, freedom of speech, which in practice means the monopolization 
of domestic media space by the government with the tone of messages being 
frequently strong and aiming to play on feeling and emotions (e.g. patriotism, 
nationalism) rather than provide rational argumentation. Such applies, for 
instance, to news coverage by the state-owned media as well as opinion shows on 
public TV and radio channels. However, should such a one-sided presentation 
of news appear in a democratic state, it is likely to be deemed non-credible 
and debunked as propaganda (Nye 2008, 100-101), since democratic citizens 
are used to the pluralism of ideas in the media. Consequently, to sell their 
messages to democratic citizens, the international versions of the state-owned 
media of authoritarian states have to “customize” them in a special way, which 
democracies’ state-owned media do not need to do in identical cases. As a result, 
the gap between the messages of domestic and international public media in 
authoritarian states is, first, wider than an analogous gap in democratic states’ 
public media and, second, is of a different character. 
Naturally, any international media have to adjust their messages to various 
target audiences if they want to succeed. However, in the case of democratic 
states’ media, such an adjustment mostly concerns their agendas: for example, 
BBC’s international versions primarily accentuate the news from the countries 
where they broadcast, while its British version covers mostly UK news (BBC 
2016). Evidence shows that when it comes to framing, the international versions 
of democratic states’ public media tend to be equally or even somewhat less 
critical about those countries’ governments initiatives compared to the domestic 
media: for instance, one case study that analysed news framing by CNN and 
CNN International found that the latter “framed coverage of American initiatives 
and individuals in a less explicitly violent and hence, less critical manner” 
(Groshek 2008, 65). Authoritarian states’ public media pursue the opposite 
logic: domestically, they tend to firmly, aggressively promote the official view 
of the government, often going as far as to ridiculing all different opinions and 
labelling them as a hoax. Internationally, an inability to use the same style as at 
home pushes those media into promoting their views in a “softer” and a more 
sophisticated way, being somewhat more critical about their governments, 
providing a broader range of opinions and imitating the style of presentation 
and discussion peculiar to the country where they broadcast.
For instance, the tone of news coverage on the US version of Russia’s publicly 
owned international TV channel RT is said to be different from that of Russia’s 
domestic public TV channels. Considering, for instance, the coverage of the 
Ukrainian crisis when it was in its ‘hottest’ phase in 2014, both RT and the 
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Russian domestic TV channels presented a pro-Russian version of events; 
however, unlike Russia’s domestic channels, RT generally refrained from most 
categorical expressions, e.g. calling the Ukrainian government “junta” and 
“fascists.” Neither was RT caught on any blatant lie, similar to Channel One’s 
story about a young boy who reportedly was crucified by the Ukrainian military 
in the town of Slovyansk and Rossiya 1’s demonstration of a fake Nazi documents 
that used to be reportedly given to Ukrainian nationalists in World War II (Ennis 
2015). Finally, unlike opinion shows on Russian domestic channels, the ones on 
RT are arguably more independent and often present views critical of Russia. 
Also, for its opinion shows, RT widely uses the formats of discussion popular 
in the US, but not in Russia (McClennen 2016). In the end, such a rhetorical 
adjustment substantially affects the very character of public diplomacy: as 
American journalist Jill Dougherty (2015) notices,
[f]or Putin, controlling the means of mass communication domestically is 
crucial in establishing a single, unchallenged narrative to unite the nation. 
Internationally, however, the Kremlin has taken a different approach: 
RT doesn’t need to monopolize its version of the truth. It simply has to 
undermine the viewer’s faith in the Western media and inundate them 
with a tidal wave of “alternative” information. 
Similar observations can be made regarding China’s publicly owned 
international media: for example, Rawnsley (2015b, 282) argues that “foreign 
language broadcasts intended for audiences outside China are often allowed 
to be more critical and liberal in tone and content than their Chinese-language 
counterparts,” although there are obvious limitations to such a criticism. The 
difference between China’s domestic and international media’s tone is especially 
sound with regard to foreign policy issues: as Wilson puts it (2015a, 290),
[a]lthough China has largely selected to pursue a deliberately non-
assertive foreign policy that assiduously avoids challenging US hegemony, 
the message it broadcasts in internal communications has a markedly 
different tone. Chinese domestic rhetoric . . . resorts to the traditional 
vocabulary of Marxist-Leninist analysis in describing China’s relationship 
with the West as a life and death struggle.
Interestingly, when it comes to politicians’ speeches, the same difference 
between democratic and authoritarian states can hardly be noticed. Of course, 
authoritarian leaders are occasionally noticed to ‘soften’ the rhetoric when 
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speaking abroad, especially when it comes to sensitive issues like human rights 
violations. For instance, one case study, that analysed the then President 
of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’s rhetoric in 2008, found that the Kremlin had 
to “alternate between a highly nationalistic rhetoric that is traditionally for 
domestic consumption and a more conciliatory, progressive rhetoric that 
positions Russia as a cooperative partner” (Avgerinos 2009, 123). However, as 
empirical and theoretical research shows, the same kind of rhetoric adjustment 
is often used by democratic politicians as well: for instance, they are noted to 
express different opinions before and after elections (Tetlock 1981), publicly and 
privately (Marfleet 2000; Renshon 2009). Likewise, they may strongly criticize 
autocrats at home, but choose far softer words in personal meetings with 
them. Perhaps the most exemplary of this point is how in 2014 the then Prime 
Minister of Australia Tony Abbott told journalists that he would “shirtfront” 
Vladimir Putin at the upcoming APEC summit, but eventually behaved far more 
diplomatically while meeting him personally, which allowed his opponents to 
blame him for cowardice (Griffiths 2014).
It is noteworthy that adjusting media rhetoric in the aforementioned way 
seems to be getting gradually harder for the media in the age of the Internet 
and globalisation, when the gap between the “internal” and the “external” is 
blurring due to all information being available to everyone (Rawnsley 2013, 
154). A question that logically arises is if such a ‘customisation’ of messages has 
a negative impact on soft power strategies’ outcome or not. Indeed, according 
to Nye (2008, 99-101), soft power’s success heavily depends on the credibility 
and, if messages at home and abroad become too different, such a country can 
be barely regarded as credible. However, this appears to be not a big problem for 
policymakers. First, psychological research shows that people tend to overlook 
inconsistency under certain circumstances, for instance, when the source of 
propaganda provides for peripheral cues that strengthen the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the message (Paul and Matthews 2016, 8). Moreover, for 
some reasons that I specify below, authoritarian leaders tend to in the first 
place care about their credibility at home and, to a lesser extent, among like-
minded foreigners (for China, see Callahan 2015; Edney 2015; for Russia, see 
Grix and Kramareva 2015). Since they treat foreign policy mostly as a way to 
gain domestic legitimacy, being seen as non-credible abroad can be regarded as 
a relatively small problem for autocrats as long as they are popular at home.
SHORT-TERM REALISM VERSUS LONG-TERM IDEALISM
Since the 19th century, the idea of democracy has had a universalistic character 
(Rosanvallon 2009), its advocates have constantly been formulating its 
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universal criteria and calling for its promotion worldwide. The universalism of 
the democratic idea implies that, consciously or subconsciously, democrats see 
the world’s future in the victory of democracy all over the world and, possibly, 
the creation a single global state based on democratic principles, which will 
epitomize Fukuyama’s “end of history.” Theorists have proposed various 
logics behind the formation of such a state. Some world system scholars, for 
instance, argue that its future origin is possible due the currently growing 
North-South imbalances that require a more legitimate and democratic global 
governance. Such will be possible in the future thanks to a growing pressure 
from transnational social movements that are getting gradually empowered 
due to increasing technological development (Chase-Dunn and Inoue 2012). 
IR constructivist scholars provide a more elaborate explanation deriving the 
formation of a global state from security needs: wars which occur between 
sovereign states are highly unwelcome for individuals who do not want to risk 
their lives, which could result in a growing solidarity between individuals from 
different states and, in effect, the formation of a world society that will constrain 
state leaders from taking decisions to initiate wars. This can at first lead to a 
global system of collective security under which collective identity and solidarity 
will gradually develop at the level of states, and later - to a world state which 
can emerge as great powers’ compromise to small and middle powers’ demands 
that their needs be recognized in the international system (Wendt 2003). At 
the current stage, “the transnational convergence of domestic values” (Wendt 
1994, 390) contributes to a collective identity between democrats as individuals 
and democracies as states; in other words, when a certain state gets recognized 
as democratic by other democracies, it means that it enters a sort of “club” of 
democratic states. Belonging to this club is considered to be prestigious, for 
it signifies a country’s commitment to the arguably best possible universally 
accepted system of values. For national image-handling, membership in this club 
creates both opportunities and limitations. First, an increase or decrease in the 
popularity of the idea of democracy in general invariably entails an improvement 
or decline in the popularity of its adherents. Second, outsiders from this club 
regard democracies’ image as one integer thing, at least to a certain extent - i.e. 
the success/failure of one democratic country is often seen as the success/failure 
of the system as a whole; so, a democratic state has to be especially careful 
whenever it does anything that may have a substantial impact on its image, 
otherwise it risks to harm the image of its fellow states.
Unlike democracy, authoritarianism as such is not universalistic; rather, 
‘authoritarian regime’ is an umbrella term that includes various types of regimes 
with diverse institutional models: to paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, all democratic 
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regimes ‘resemble each other,’ while every non-democratic regime is non-
democratic ‘in its own way’. Naturally, this does not mean that all democracies 
are absolutely identical: their peculiarities can vary, but, as Peter Burnell 
(2010, 9) puts it, they “all still operate within the bounds of a broad consensus 
on democracy’s most essential defining features. These resemble very closely 
western-style liberal democracy, sometimes called polyarchy, and incorporate 
ideas about universal human rights that receive United Nations backing.” Hence, 
one can figure out certain criteria by which to judge whether a certain country is 
democratic, as it is done, for example, by the Economist Intelligent Unit which 
annually publishes its Democracy Index (for its latest version, see EIU 2016). In 
contrast to democracies, “leading authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes 
are so diverse, ranging from one-party states and military-backed personal 
rule to theocracy and, even, cases of what has come to called competitive 
authoritarianism: regimes that resemble some of democracy’s ideas” (Burnell 
2010, 10).
Consequently, authoritarianism per se hardly generates a collective identity - at 
least, to the extent that belonging to the democratic “club” does - though certain 
variations of authoritarianism, like the 19th century’s absolute monarchs or 
the 20th century’s communist regimes, used to have common global intentions 
and a sense of collective identity. The reason behind is that common ideologies 
generate resemblances in the culture of mutual interaction; therefore, like-
minded states are more likely to become friends with each other than states with 
different ideologies (such is a common explanation of the idea of democratic 
peace, see Owen 1994). Nevertheless, authoritarianism as such is not an ideology, 
so autocracies do not form the same sort of “club” as do democracies and, 
accordingly, their national images are not affected by the images of each other 
like it happens in the case of democracies. It is no surprise that we have nothing 
like an “authoritarian peace” theory: one can expect democratic states to better 
understand each other, but one can hardly expect two autocracies to be friends, 
since their concrete ideas and values can be totally different (e.g. a communist 
regime and an absolute monarchy). Such a limited ability to engender a common 
identity as well as the non-universality of the idea of authoritarianism make any 
global strategic plans for the future practically impossible for autocracies. As a 
result, autocracies normally have friendly relations just to the extent that their 
foreign policy goals coincide in realpolitik terms, which can usually be defined 
in short- or mid-term perspectives. To exemplify, scholars often argue that the 
origin of Russo-Chinese cooperation is in both countries’ desire to balance the 
US and the West in general in geopolitics and geoeconomics, while in most of 
the other spheres the two countries seem to mistrust each other and want to take 
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advantage of each other’s weakness to their own favour (Carlsson et al. 2015; 
Kaczmarski 2013). A similar logic also applies to Sino-Iranian and Russo-Iranian 
relationships: whereas those countries’ official statements may describe mutual 
relationships as warm friendships and even strategic unions, on close inspection, 
it seems that the “warmness” is actually determined on case-by-case basis and 
highly depends on those states’ relations with the West at each particular period 
(Harold and Nader 2012; Kozhanov 2012). All in all, it is far from certain if those 
countries were friends but for their aim to counter the Western influence - in 
contrast to, for instance, the US and the EU that are more likely to be expected 
to be friends due to ideological convergence even if they did not have common 
rivals.
For soft power strategies, this discussion has two major implications. First, 
democracies’ soft power is strongly embedded in their values with ideology 
being treated seriously, which, as was argued above, not only provides 
opportunities for, but also poses significant limitations on how they can position 
themselves internationally. Autocracies’ soft power is determined mostly in 
realpolitik terms: the way they promote themselves is more dependent on the 
current situation in world affairs and at home rather than on any ideological 
commitments. Their tendency not to treat ideology seriously clearly manifests 
itself in the way they constantly match their domestic environment with the 
ideological underpinnings of soft power strategies. For instance, in 2000, 
Russia’s regime created the concept of “managed,” or “guided democracy” 
to justify its regime’s deviations from the universally accepted model of 
democratic governance. Later, in 2006, as the regime got tougher and the 
West’s accusations of human rights violations became more frequent, ‘managed 
democracy’ was transformed into ‘sovereign democracy’. Finally, when Putin’s 
administration firmly decided to position Russia as a self-sufficient civilisation, 
which is based on conservative values different from the West, the very concept 
of democracy was dropped and gradually disappeared from the official Russian 
discourse (Sontag 2013). Similarly, China’s ruling Communist Party has adopted 
the concepts of ‘deliberate democracy’ and ‘consultative democracy’ aiming to 
pursue regime legitimacy at the local and party members’ levels respectively 
(Halper 2012; Tang 2014, 116-118). It remains to be seen if these concepts will be 
long-lasting; however, the overall logic of the adjustment of the term ‘democracy’ 
to the needs of authoritarian regimes so far shows that such invented concepts 
are usually rather transient.
Another illustration of exercising soft power in realpolitik terms is an 
international aid. For instance, with a few exceptions (e.g. concerning countries 
suffering from natural disasters), the most part of the Russian aid, first, goes to 
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the countries where Russia has strong geopolitical interests and, second, unlike 
Western states’ aid, is given to the recipient countries’ governments rather 
than NGOs (Brezhneva and Ukhova 2013, 13-14; Ćweik-Karpowicz 2012, 9). A 
similar logic applies to Chinese foreign aid as well: unlike the aid of Western 
democracies, first, it is hardly ever coordinated with other donors, second, it 
is not usually linked to conditions, except for supporting China’s investments, 
and third, is oriented toward economic rather than social goals, thus engaging 
governments and not NGOs (Trinidad 2013). In general, when autocracies 
provide foreign aid, they pursue economic (breaking into new markets), political 
(creating a strategic diplomacy), to a lesser extent ideological goals (spreading 
national values) (see Lengauer 2011, 44 for China), while democracies, in 
accordance with their ideological commitments, normally provide socially 
oriented foreign aid.
It, however, would be too naive to assume that democracies are guided solely 
by their ideologies and not economic or political interests: many realist scholars, 
for example, tend to regard democracy and human rights rhetoric as a cheap 
talk arguing that democratic powers simply disguise their national interests 
under those labels (Hyde-Price 2008). Rather, my argument is that, to handle 
their image, democracies have to justify every step by referring to its usefulness 
for democracy, liberalism and human rights, while for autocracies it suffices to 
say that they solely want to protect their ‘national interests,’ the term which in 
practice usually means the interests of their ruling elites.
The second implication is that democratic soft power aims at long-
term strategic goals, while autocracies are guided by short-term tactical 
considerations. The systemic view of the world causes democratic states to work 
on the reputation of responsible actors who take care of themselves, the world 
and future generations. Autocratic leaders, by contrast, are not certain if the 
legacy of their regimes will be long-lasting after their death,3 so it is more rational 
for them to try to take as much benefit as possible from the present day. For this 
end, they prefer focusing on the issues that are likely to give them immediate 
gains in reputation; for autocracies, having an image of responsible powers is, 
although often desirable, not as indispensable as for democracies. Thanks to 
the absence of ideological limitations and a sense of collective responsibility, 
autocracies feel generally freer than democracies when it comes to resorting to 
3 Sometimes they admit having such a fear openly. Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko, 
for instance, known for his opposition to the privatization of state-owned factories, once claimed: 
‘I am horrified at the thought that the Belarusian wealth that I have toiled so hard to create and 
preserve would be auctioned off’ (RT 2013).
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a populist rhetoric to gain easy popularity today even if it may seem harmful for 
the future.
An apt illustration of this point is the place of global issues in the soft power 
strategies of democracies and autocracies. For instance, unlike the European 
Union and the United States, Russia has been noted for being silent and passive 
on climate change issues (Charap 2010), occasionally going as far as overtly 
mocking the international community on this issue: in 2003, for instance, 
Putin famously said at an international climate conference that global warming 
is good, since it would enable Russian people to “spend less on fur coats,” 
after which he added that “agricultural specialists say our grain production 
will increase, and thank God for that” (Bastasch 2015). However, sometimes 
Russian leaders suddenly employ the opposite rhetoric on climate change, 
which is largely interpreted in tactical terms: for example, at his speech before 
the UN General Assembly in December 2015, Putin raised the problem of 
climate change seriousness, which most experts considered an attempt to break 
Russia’s international isolation (Davenport 2015). Likewise, until recently, 
China’s authorities were traditionally reluctant to take global warming seriously 
claiming that it is the West that should take the major responsibility for it 
(Heggelund 2007, 175-179), and only the geopolitical desire to build an image 
of a responsible global power so as to counter the popular-in-the-West China-
threat theory as well as an unprecedentedly high level of pollution have recently 
driven the country’s government to gradually change their initial standpoint 
(Hung and Tsai 2012).
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY VERSUS PROMOTING 
AUTHORITARIANISM
Since the end of World War II, democracy has been widely recognized as a 
universal value, universal commitment and the most progressive form of 
governance. Authoritarian regimes, by this logic, are regarded as inferior and 
less advanced; therefore, it is not in the least coincidental that even the world’s 
most violent dictatorships are constantly trying to show their commitment to 
democracy by imitating democratic institutions (e.g. elections), using democratic 
narrative in public discourse and official names (e.g. “People’s Democratic 
Republic of Korea”) etc. In the recent years, however, the global popularity 
of democracy has reportedly declined against the background of democratic 
dysfunction in solving certain social problems (Foa and Mounk 2015), but, 
as surveys show, most people across the globe still find democratic values 
important (Wike and Simmons 2015). For democratic states, the ideationally 
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dominant position of their ideology poses good opportunities to use it in their 
image-enhancing policies and ensures a favourable climate for its promotion 
abroad. Democratic countries can proudly call themselves democratic, blame 
other countries for not meeting the criteria of a democratic state, set up 
organisations that promote democratic institutions.
Authoritarian countries, by contrast, have to tolerate being dominated, which 
results in a so-called “victim mentality” peculiar to such states: they tend to 
conceive of themselves as victims of others’ (in their case, democracies’) negative 
behaviour and act accordingly (for China, see Medeiros 2009, 10-11; for Russia, 
see Coicaud 2015, 174).4 They have to adjust the tactics of the promotion of their 
values making it somehow hidden, since, under the conditions of democracy’s 
dominance, overtly claiming that authoritarianism is better than democracy 
would be equal to arguing that economic decline is preferable to economic 
growth. Consequently, unlike democracies, modern autocracies would rather 
skip placing a special emphasis on a political regime when furthering their 
international image. Moreover, they frequently masquerade their soft power 
policies as democracy promotion: for instance, despite its name, the Institute 
for Democracy and Cooperation, funded by the Russian government and located 
in Paris, “cultivates an image of itself as critical of NATO and the EU and 
supportive of a traditional set of values in line with the political elite of Russia” 
- the activities that are hardly compatible with ‘democracy’ and ‘cooperation’ 
(Demesmay 2016, 2).
Another factor that impedes autocracy promotion is that, as I stated above, 
unlike democracy, authoritarianism per se is far from universalistic and hence, 
does not have any single criteria. Therefore, in promoting their image abroad, 
authoritarian regimes would rather resort to their national values, national 
identities, patriotism etc., which have little to do with universalism. Moreover, 
due to its aforementioned limited ability to engender a collective identity 
between states, promoting authoritarianism would actually give little benefit for 
autocracies in terms of mutual interaction. This all results in modern autocracies 
not really being interested in furthering authoritarianism as such; rather, 
they usually try to promote “their own countries’ more narrow economic and 
geopolitical interests” (Way 2016, see also Way 2015, Tansey 2016). An ample 
illustration of this point is international organisations led by non-democratic 
4 In many cases, victim mentality originates in a country’s past, which can be a lost war, a 
colonial status etc. My argument is that a situation, in which a country finds itself ideologically 
different from or even opposite to most other states, deepens its victim mentality, due to which 
politicians and people develop an idea of their country being “besieged,” “encircled,” “surrounded”.
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countries. For instance, while joining the EU requires meeting its standards of 
democracy and human rights, Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union does not 
adduce any political criteria of accession, inviting new states irrespective of their 
political regime.
So, despite that the term ‘autocracy promotion’ exists in academic literature, in 
fact, it appears more accurate to speak of ‘democracy prevention’ or ‘authoritarian 
collaboration,’ like do some other scholars (Soest 2015). Cooperation between 
authoritarian regimes seems to be directed not against democracy as such, 
but mostly against democracy promotion, since autocratic leaders fear losing 
their domestic power at home and influence in the countries where they have 
a favourable image. With pragmatically oriented democratic states that do not 
intend to actively export their values, authoritarian regimes tend to have good 
relations. Among such countries is, for example, Italy, which used to have good 
relations with Libya’s Qadhafi regime and actively lobby the removal of anti-
Russian sanctions in the EU council in 2014-2015 (Tocci 2014; Varvelli 2010). 
As Italian political scientist Arturo Varvelli rightly puts it (2010, 130), “[i]n the 
classic ‘stability or democracy dilemma,’ Italy has always chosen the former, 
contributing more than any other country to strengthening Qadhafi’s regime.”
PROACTIVENESS VERSUS REACTIVENESS
Falling short of a universalistic idea, modern autocracies have difficulties in 
finding a constructive agenda to offer global audiences. National ideologies and 
political values may at best be attractive in certain like-minded states mostly at 
the regional level, but are unlikely to appeal to global civil society. In the case of 
Russia, for instance, the “Russian world” concept coupled with the conservative 
values’ narrative aim to endear the country merely to the Russian-speaking 
world, the post-Soviet states and, to a lesser extent, a few “fellow travellers” of 
Russia (Laruelle 2015, 23). In such circumstances, autocracies have to accept 
the dominance of democratic ideas and elaborate their soft power strategies 
proceeding from the popularity of democracy in this or that region. In other 
words, autocracies’ soft power strategies are reactive rather than proactive: 
their content and intensity highly depend on the intensity of their competitors’ 
soft power strategies and the popularity of their ideas in the recipient countries.
How does a strategy’s pro- and reactiveness affect its features? Some insight 
can be taken from theories of Marketing-oriented Public Relations. First, 
proactive strategies are offensive, while reactive ones are defensive: while 
the former aim to communicate the actor’s merits, the latter attempt to cope 
with negative consequences brought by the external environment (Shimp 
2010, 537). With regard to autocracies’ soft power strategies, such negative 
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consequences flow not only from the objective factors that I mentioned above (e.g. 
technological progress), but also democracies’ soft power. To illustrate, Russia 
first came to the idea of an active public diplomacy campaign after Ukraine’s 
2004 Orange Revolution which the Kremlin viewed as its geopolitical loss and 
thus felt the need to curb the growth of pro-Western mindsets on the post-Soviet 
space (Saari 2014; Ćwiek-Karpowicz 2012, 6). In a similar vein, the primarily 
negative depiction of Russian policies in the international media during the 
2008 Russo-Georgian war later made the Kremlin intensify its international 
broadcasting and politicise the RT Channel which had initially aimed to promote 
Russian culture (Yablokov 2015, 305). Likewise, China realized the importance 
of soft power in the mid-2000s to a large extent as a need to counter the 
aforementioned China-threat theory (Glaser and Murphy 2009). In particular 
(Rawnsley 2015a, 466),
[i]t is possible to argue that the expansion of China’s international 
broadcasting capacity has not been designed around a primary aim of 
boosting the country’s soft power potential, but rather is a reactive and 
defensive strategy to meet a supposed cultural threat and is intended to 
remedy a defect in how China is reported by international news media.
Autocracies’ defensive strategies are mostly based on finding flaws in democratic 
states and criticising them rather than praising domestic political values and 
ideas; otherwise stated, autocracies widely employ against- rather than in 
favour of- narratives, since they aim to correct the existent dominant agenda 
rather than set a new one. For cautiousness, that criticism is normally directed 
not against democracy as such, but, rather, against the concrete actions of 
democratic states. Due to the shortage of potentially attractive political ideas 
related to the present, autocracies widely exploit a historical narrative aiming 
to evoke the recipient audience’ emotions related to the sense of national pride. 
What can, for instance, be accentuated is historically good relations between the 
two countries. For instance, to gain support of conservative people on the post-
Soviet space, Russia resorts to highlighting the common origin of East Slavs and 
promoting the Russian official version of the history of World War II, which 
is coupled with labelling every attempt to provide any different perspective, 
especially in Ukraine and the Baltics, as the “falsification” and “distortion” of 
history (Lutsevych 2016, 16-18). Another way to play on emotions is to exploit 
the above-mentioned ‘victim mentality’ - but this time of the recipient countries. 
Autocracies tend to make use of people’s resentment by pointing out either 
the West’s unequal treatment of its former colonies in the past, or the flaws of 
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the West-dominated international order in the present. China, for instance, is 
known for widely applying a so-called ‘negative’ soft power based on “othering” 
the West (Callahan 2015), for which it often falls back on anti-colonial rhetoric 
when it comes to African states (Huang and Ding 2006, 38).
The second implication of pro- and reactiveness is that proactive strategies 
are opportunity seeking while reactive ones are problem solving (Shimp 2010, 
537). It manifests itself in the fact that the democratic states’ perception of 
soft power’s ultimate goal - turning rivals into friends - is hardly shared by 
authoritarian states in practice: for example, case study show that China’s image-
enhancing activities primarily aim to strengthen regime legitimacy and national 
identity domestically rather than “win hearts and minds” in the competing states 
(Callahan 2015, 225-226; Wilson 2015a, 291-292). In a similar fashion, Russia 
is noted for “misinterpretation” of soft power, since “instead of winning people 
over who do not share Russia’s foreign principles and goals, the country seeks to 
mobilize those who already agree with them” (Ćweik-Karpowicz 2012, 9). What 
is more, autocracies often go as far as rejecting Nye’s conception of soft power 
as changing people’s minds as too aggressive and contradictory to the principle 
of national sovereignty. Such can be seen in China, where soft power is deemed 
not only as a foreign policy opportunity, but, importantly, as the West’s weapon 
which may be applied “in the fomenting of Colour Revolutions as a means to 
change China” (Wilson 2015a, 290). Russia goes even further, explicitly stating 
in its Foreign Policy Concept (MFA of Russia 2013) that:
“[s]oft power,” a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy 
objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and 
other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is 
becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. 
At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis 
potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of 
“soft power” and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on 
sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their 
political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext 
of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have endeavoured to show that the way a country handles its 
image abroad is at least partially dependent on its political regime (see Table 1). 
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Naturally, it does not in the least mean that other factors such as a country’s size, 
its geographical location, economic capacities, history, culture, current political 
priorities etc do not impact on the characteristics of its soft power strategy. 
Importantly, such characteristics determine the main differences between the 
Russian and Chinese soft power strategies. For instance, compared to China, 
Russia possesses far less material resources to conduct a coherent soft power 
strategy at a global level. Furthermore, whereas China is attempting to create an 
image of a peaceful country that avoids clashes, Russia is currently involved in a 
strong ideological confrontation with the West: therefore, while China primarily 
accentuates its 5,000-year-old culture and philosophy, Russia seeks to attract 
critics of liberalism worldwide placing a higher emphasis on traditional family 
values, “enlightened conservatism,” anti-LGBTI rhetoric etc (Wilson 2015b, 
1190-1191).
Table 1. Soft Power Strategies’ Characteristics Dependent on a Political Regime
Criteria Democratic States Authoritarian States
Actors Involved 
and their Roles
A soft power strategy is mainly 
conducted by and serves the 
goals of the private sector and a 
civil society. The state’s function is 
mostly advisory and coordinating; 
the state also fills the gaps left by 
the first two actors.
The state elaborates and decides on the 
goals of a soft power strategy as well as 
controls its implementation. The state is 
also its main participant; a civil society 
and the private sector participate in soft 
power strategies only where and to the 





D o m e s t i c  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
versions of the public media have 
no or almost no difference in the 
content and manner of reporting.
The public media show more partiality, 
emot ional ly  stronger rhetor ic and 
narrower range of  opin ions when 
broadcasting at home than abroad.
Temporal Frames
A soft power strategy primarily 
aims to fulfill long-term strategic 
goals.
A soft power strategy is mainly used 
as a combination of short-term tactical 
moves.
Reference to 
Regime in the 
Discourse
The political regime is accentuated 
and promoted with a sense of pride 
as a country’s high achievement.
The political regime is not specially 
highlighted or even sold as democracy.
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Ideological Goals
A soft power strategy’s ideological 
componen t  i s  s t ab l e ,  t aken 
r e l a t i v e l y  s e r i o u s l y  b y  t h e 
authorities and treated by them as 
one of the strategic goals.
The ideological component of a soft 
power strategy is treated as a means 
rather than a goal; it is unstable and 
often get adjusted depending on a 





A soft power strategy emerges 
from below by itself, irrespective of 
competitors’ activities.
A soft power strategy emerges as a 
governmental reaction to the activities of 
democratic states.
Moreover, some researchers argue that the political regime has a more specific 
impact on soft power strategies when it is considered in a combination with 
other factors: for instance, according to Wilson (2015a, 295), it is important 
that Russia and China “are not simply authoritarian states, but rather 
authoritarian regimes that have been deeply imprinted with the values and 
attitudes of their Marxist-Leninist heritage, which constitutes an important 
element of their national identity.” In either case, it appears that the democracy/
authoritarianism dichotomy should be always taken into account as a variable by 
case study researchers when they describe the specificities of certain countries’ 
soft power strategies. The main issue that still remains unclear is to what extent 
all autocracies’ peculiarities impact on the efficiency of soft power strategies. 
As I stated in the Introduction, the traditional liberal view championed by Nye 
is that the absence of universalistic ideas as well as the lack of consistency and 
coherence undermine credibility and, hence, limit the capability of a soft power 
strategy to produce a good image. However, some other publications seem 
to question the usefulness of universalism: for instance, the growth of anti-
Americanism in the world in the 2000s is believed to have partially originated 
in the perceived ubiquity of American culture and “over-success” of US soft 
power in the world (Fan 2008, 154). Similarly, as I argued above, a shortage of 
coherence and consistency often does not sap a message’s credibility for certain 
psychological reasons. Yet, two main problems seem to hinder doing proper 
research on democracies’ and autocracies’ soft power efficiency. First, such 
would require a profound analysis of psychological, marketing and PR theories 
and their subsequent integration into the IR field. Second, it appears hard (albeit 
not impossible) to disentangle the impact of country A’s soft power on country B’s 
elite and public opinion from the impact of other forces.
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